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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the moderation of inflation in three transition economies, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland at the end of the 1990s. We argue that the institutions for the
conduct of monetary policy in these countries were relatively weak and that monetary policy was
unsupported by fiscal policy and hampered by multiple objectives.  Using a VAR model of
inflation, we show that, under a variety of assumptions, foreign prices and the persistence of
inflation were the key determinants of inflation in these countries.  From this finding we
conclude that the moderation of inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was due
largely to the decline in import prices from 1997 on, and thus it is likely be a temporary
phenomenon.
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Non-Technical Summary
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are strong candidates for European Union
(EU) membership. Most observers believe that these countries will be the first group to join the
EU. One key condition for an eventual membership is that these countries lower their inflation
rates to an average level of inflation rate in the Union. As a result of price liberalization and
other economic reforms, many transition economies have been able to lower their inflation rates
from a very high level to a moderate one, ranging about 15-20 percent per annum. However,
these countries have not been able to cut the inflation rate down further to a lower,  single digit
level. For this purpose, all three countries have announced an “inflation targeting” policy to
control their inflation within a target range in the single digits.
The purpose of this paper is to provide some evidence about the determinants of inflation
in the three transition economies. To the extent that such determinants are under the control of
policymakers, it is likely that the inflation targeting policy can yield the desirable outcome of
single-digit inflation rates. As sources of inflation pressures we employ data on nominal wages,
money supply, past inflation behavior, and import prices. Our sample period covers the period
from 1990 to the end of 1998. This period reflects the period leading up to and including the fall
in import prices but not the period covering the subsequent increase in import prices.
Empirical evidence indicates that nominal wage growth and the money supply are
quantitatively unimportant contributors to the inflationary process in the short run.  Because
these two factors, which are relatively easy for monetary authorities to influence, have so little
short-term impact on inflation, the decline in inflation in these countries at the end of the 1990s
may not be a good indicator of the effectiveness of monetary policy and of the future ability of
monetary authorities in these countries to reduce inflation to, or to contain it at, the levels seen in
the late 1990s or required after accession to the European Union.  On the other hand, import
price movements and past inflation are significant contributors to the inflation in all three
countries. Our findings regarding the role of foreign prices in determining inflation also explain
the sharp decline in inflation in the three countries at the end of the 1990s. It also serves to
explain the increase in the rate of inflation seen in 2001 and evident from monthly data for 2002.
These findings indicate that the sharp decline in inflation observed at the end of the 1990s
in the three countries should be seen as an exogenously caused event rather than the outcome of
monetary policy. These exogenous factors, which are the result of external deflation that stems
from exogenous declines in global commodity and energy prices and from a general global
deflation, have already begun to reverse themselves, especially in terms of energy prices. Thus,
inflation remains a threat to these countries and the successes of the late 1990s may not be an
accurate indicator of how well the monetary authorities in these countries can control inflation
under new international circumstances.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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I.  INTRODUCTION
A number of transition economies, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland among
them, have seemingly stabilized their economies, built up the institutions required for the
functioning of a modern market economy, privatized the greater part of their productive assets,
restructured their industries and integrated themselves into the global economy. Perhaps most
remarkably, after being stuck at double-digit levels of inflation of a “moderate” level (see, e.g.,
Medgyessy, 1998; Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993, Ball, 1994: Burton and Fischer, 1998), at the
end of 1998 or the beginning of 1999 the inflation rates of these countries, as measured by the
consumer price index (CPI), fell to single digit levels, as shown in Figure 1. Indeed, on a month-
on-month basis, these countries were experiencing no inflation or even deflation at the end of
1998 and the beginning of 1999.
Some observers have interpreted this outcome, which few would have predicted at the
beginning of 1998, as a lesson on how to end persistent moderate inflation in other transition
economies. Moreover, this seeming success in disinflating has raised expectations that these
countries can easily achieve the kind of price stability that will enable them to peg to the Euro
soon after their accession to European Union membership and thereafter to become part of the
Euro zone. Before we accept the policy choices made by these three countries as a guide for
ending moderate inflation in other transition economies, it behooves us to examine more closely
whether, indeed, the results now before us can be the direct outcome of the policies followed or
whether a more cautious interpretation of these results is warranted. This reexamination is all the
more important as Figure 1 indicates that inflation in thee countries has begun to rebound after
1999 as oil prices have risen.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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During the early stages of transition, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
implemented stabilization programs based on nominal anchors, primarily the exchange rate but
also at times the wage rate, and they relied largely on direct controls and quantitative restrictions
to implement monetary policy. Subsequently, as stabilization took hold and as their financial
institutions and markets matured, all of them abandoned the pegging of their nominal exchange
rates and adopted indirect methods of monetary control and, ultimately, inflation targeting.
1 In
this paper, we examine whether a disinflation that reduced inflation to single digit levels, even to
low single digit levels, could have been the outcome of the monetary policies and the
institutional environment of these countries. We consider the instruments of monetary policy and
argue that the process of transition and the building up of market economy institutions probably
had not progressed sufficiently in the course of the 1990s to allow indirect instruments of
monetary policy to bring inflation to the levels of 1998 and 1999 and to keep it at those levels or
to continue such a disinflation in a less benign international environment. We are also not
sanguine about the ability of monetary instruments to root out moderate inflation because, as we
argue below, monetary policy is overburdened by having to pursue multiple objectives and
because it is inadequately supported by fiscal policy.
          We also examine whether approaches such as inflation targeting can be used effectively by
transition economies. Much of our argument rests on an analysis of the root causes of inflation in
these economies. This analysis concludes that the principal causes of inflation are either
exogenous or beyond the direct control of the monetary authorities. Therefore, we should be
cautious in accepting recent inflation results as a signal that moderate inflation in these transition
economies has been conquered by past monetary policies.
                                                          
1 For the Czech Republic, see Begg, 1998; for Hungary, see Szapary and Jakab, 1998 and, for Poland, Wellisz, 1997.
Gottschalk and Moore (2001) and Orlowski (2001) study the viability of inflation targeting as a monetary policy inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY POLICY
A.  The Institutional Basis for Monetary Policy
            While we accept the notion that the long-run effect of monetary policy is to be found in
the movements of prices and not of real output, there are important short-term links between the
real and monetary spheres in transition economies. On the one hand, the rate of inflation does
influence the decisions of firms and consumers about the level of saving and investment as well
as about the specific form that these will take. At the same time, the effectiveness of monetary
policy depends to a large extent on the behavior of the real sector. The effectiveness of indirect
methods of monetary control now employed in the three countries under consideration also
depends on the effectiveness of monetary institutions, including capital markets and the banking
system.
Although there has been some tightening of the budget constraint for firms in all three
countries, it is not at all evident that this emerging financial discipline has been sufficient to
drive loss-making firms into bankruptcy rather than leaving them in a limbo of growing
indebtedness and payments arrears. Firms continue to run losses that are
sometimes covered by government subsidies, sometimes by loans from banks and sometimes by
other enterprises.
2   In such circumstances, firms may continue to lack the necessary incentives to
restructure and thus to respond appropriately to changes in interest rates. Indeed, they may
behave perversely, engaging in increased borrowing and in more risky investments, including
                                                                                                                                                                                          
these countries.
2 While explicit subsidies have been reduced, there are implicit subsidies in the form of tax-payment arrears,
guarantees of loans using government-owned stock, etc., Brixi (2000), Drabek and Schneider (2000). The lack of
effective bankruptcy procedures and so-called creditor passivity continue to play an important part in all three
economies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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leveraged takeovers of rivals, as the interest rate increases. Privatization has also reduced the
effectiveness of monetary policy by placing many firms in the hands of foreign MNCs, thus
enabling them to evade home-country monetary policies through their access to parent-company
funds (Hawkins and Macaluso, 1977; Estrin et al., 2000). There is also evidence that the real
sector, meaning non-financial firms, is to a large extent self-financed, as the net flow of funds
has been largely from the non-financial sector to banks rather than the other way (Dittus, 1994).
Moreover, there is compelling evidence that it is the less efficient and unprofitable firms that
receive a disproportionate share of the loans that are made to businesses (see, e.g., Bonin and
Schaffer, 1994; Coricelli, 1998, Ch. 2). 
The distortions evident in the real sector also have their counterparts in the monetary
sector. Commercial banks in the three countries face a number of problems. Relative to their bad
loans, they appear to be under-capitalized. In Hungary and the Czech Republic, they have had to
have some of their bad loans written off, while in Poland they have been encouraged to attempt
to work out problem loans.
3 Neither approach has entirely resolved the problems of commercial
banks, and much new lending in all three countries continues to go to firms that are likely to
become problem borrowers in the future. In part, this is due to the fact that the banks are captives
of enterprises to whom they have lent in the past and whose outstanding loans they continue to
roll over through new financing rather than writing them off.  In part, it is due to the fact that the
commercial banks simply lack the personnel needed to make better lending decisions. Finally,
the pattern of privatization in the transition economies also plays a role in the lending policies of
commercial banks. Especially in the Czech Republic, the banks, although “privatized”, have had
                                                          
3 For bank reforms and behavior, see Mochrie et al. (1998), van Vijnbergen (1995) and the special issue of the
Journal of Comparative Economics (1996) dealing with commercial banking in transition economies. It is
noteworthy that in 1998 Hungary had to undertake a major rescue of its two largest commercial banks while some ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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the state as their largest shareholder, and thus the state’s preferences regarding lending decisions
may have played a decisive role. Czech commercial banks not only lend to firms, but in many
cases they are also the largest share holders of these firms, creating further incentives to continue
lending to problem firms.
The existence of large problem loans has led monetary authorities to maintain high
spreads between lending and borrowing rates so as to boost banks’ profits and thus their ability
to build up their reserves. However, in addition to discouraging savers from placing funds with
the banking system and firms from borrowing from it, both of which reduce the effectiveness of
monetary policy, the creation of these artificial profits in the banking sector has had three other
negative consequences for the effectiveness of monetary policy. One is the emergence of small
under-capitalized banks that lack the skills and perhaps even the desire to make prudent loans;
many of these banks have gone under or have had to be absorbed by larger banks. However, their
presence in the financial system has undermined the efficiency with which credit is allocated to
non-financial firms and impeded the functioning of the inter-bank credit market.  A second
consequence has been the entry of foreign banks, which have been alleged to engage in “cherry
picking” or selecting only the most credit worthy of the local firms for clients and leaving the
less attractive borrowers for the local banks. The third consequence has been that local firms
have tended to borrow abroad, thus bypassing local banks and, therefore, also, domestic
monetary policy.
Exacerbating the manifest weaknesses of the credit markets is the fact that stock markets
in the three countries do not provide a viable substitute. They are thin and subject to extreme
swings in prices, often as the result of inflows and outflows of foreign capital. Moreover, these
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the largest commercial banks in the Czech Republic, although recently privatized,  were arguably in worse condition
at the end of the 1990s  than they were at the beginning of the transition.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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stock markets have not been effective in raising funds through IPOs.
4 In part this is due to the
rather disappointing returns that these stock markets have generated. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that, to the extent that monetary policy needs to
influence the behavior of banks and non-bank actors in the economy to be effective, there is
reason to doubt that there has been enough progress to date to ensure that such influence will be
sufficiently predictable and strong to guarantee that indirect tools of monetary policy can
effectively master inflation. Moreover, the fact that monetary policy is to some extent dictated by
the need to encourage the restructuring of firms, to recapitalize the banking system and to enable
the government to finance its deficits suggests that the monetary authorities in these countries are
likely to face severe conflicts in the formulation of monetary policy.
B.  Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy
A dispassionate view of economic policy in the three countries suggests that monetary
policy has had to bear the brunt of the stabilization effort while governments have been relatively
unwilling to make unpopular decisions to reduce fiscal deficits. In the case of Poland, Wellisz
(1997) notes that, during the 1991-93 period,“[i]t is clear…that the monetization of the fiscal
deficit acted as the ‘motor of inflation’” (p. 165) while subsequently the government borrowed
from commercial banks, driving up interest rates so that “fiscal policy…. is at the root of the
credit tightness decried by borrowers” (p. 169). Of course, this same credit crunch constrains the
monetary policies of the National Bank of Poland (NBP). While the government’s deficit is not
especially high, it is expanding as a share of GDP and thus can hardly be viewed as contributing
to the fight against inflation (Kemme and Rapacki, 2000).
                                                          
4 For example, the Czech Republic, with the highest stock market capitalization to GDP ratio in the region, has not
had a single IPO.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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Much the same can be said about the contribution of fiscal policy to stabilization in
Hungary, where the general government deficit reached 8.4% of GDP in 1994 (Haggard et al.,
1998). It was only an impending economic crisis that led to the Bokros package of reforms that,
according to Kornai (1997), “…brought to an end the habitual conduct of decades – the policy of
‘muddling through’” (p.125). Nevertheless, despite Kornai’s optimistic assessment, the
Hungarian deficit has grown again, thus leaving the battle against inflation largely to monetary
policy.
In the Czech Republic, officially reported fiscal deficits have been small but increasing.
During the period leading up to the speculative attack on the koruna in May 1997, the
government proved unable to act to tighten fiscal policy, and it was only in the aftermath of the
attack on the koruna that measures were taken to reduce the deficit (Brada and Kutan, 1999).
Despite this harsh lesson, the coalition government that took over in the wake of the crisis has
enacted much more expansionary budgets (Drabek and Schneider, 2000) while trying to limit the
autonomy of the central bank.
In sum, while monetary policy, at least as measured by real interest rates, has been tight
in all three countries, the same cannot be said for the trend in fiscal policy. Although such a
policy mix may provide central bankers in the region an opportunity to create some credibility
for their institutions, it also reflects a propensity on the part of politicians to evade difficult
choices and to rely on monetary policy to make up for their unwillingness to restrict government
spending or to increase taxes.
C. Exchange Rate Policy
The conduct of monetary policy has also been complicated by exchange rate policy and
by the opening up of these countries’ rather fragile financial systems to international capitalWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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flows. High interest rates and either fixed exchange rates or pre-announced crawling pegs have
led to significant inflows of short-term capital. In order to avoid inflationary pressures from the
inflows of foreign capital, central banks have engaged in sometimes massive sterilization.
5 Not
only has this sterilization been costly for the central banks, but it also has not been entirely
successful, so that targets for monetary growth have often been exceeded, even though interest
rates have remained high in order to prevent sudden outflows of foreign capital. Of course, such
high interest rates tend to increase costs of production, thus reducing exports and making these
countries’ currencies more vulnerable to speculative attack.
In sum, monetary policy in the three countries considered in this paper as yet rests on
relatively weak financial markets and institutions, and it operates in an environment where the
agents it seeks to influence may react to monetary policy in undesirable ways or not at all.
Moreover, monetary policy is unsupported by fiscal policy and has to promote a multitude of
often-conflicting objectives. IN light of these considerations it is worthwhile to ask how much of
the good inflation performance of these economies at the end of  the 1990s was the fortuitous
result of deflation in Western Europe and of falling oil prices and how much reflected the
effectiveness of domestic policies.
III. CAUSES OF INFLATION AND POLICIES FOR DISINFLATION
A.  Causes of Inflation
In order to understand the role that monetary policy can play in reducing the rate of
inflation, it is worthwhile to seek out the root causes of inflation in transition economies. As the
discussion below shows, there are some causes that are specific to the transition economies and
                                                          
5  For the Czech case, see Begg (1998), for Hungary, Szapary and Jakab (1998), and Wellisz (1997) for the Polish
case.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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that do not appear to be easily combated by means of indirect monetary tools. Most important, it
does not appear that the growth of the money stock is the main source of inflationary pressures in
the short run.
1.  Undervaluation  of the Exchange Rate.  Some observers, such as Desai (1998) and Richards
and Tersmann (1996), argue that inflation in transition economies is largely the result of the initial
over-depreciation of their currencies. This inflation is not the outcome of the usual wage-price
spiral induced by devaluation, but, rather, it is the result of the workings of the law of one price,
or commodity arbitrage, which creates domestic inflation so as to reestablish purchasing power
parity. Wellisz (1997) describes the process in the case of the Polish crawling peg thus: “As long
as the rate of slide is set so as to result in the continuing real overvaluation (sic! – although the
subsequent sentence indicates that this should be undervaluation) of the zloty,  international
prices exercise an upward pull on domestic prices” (p. 168).
2.  Large Relative Price Changes.  A characteristic of transition economies is that their relative
prices were badly distorted. Given the downward stickiness of prices, the bulk of price
readjustment in the course of transition thus occurs as some prices increase by large amounts and
others either remain constant or increase by relatively small amounts.  These large price changes,
usually price increases due to the downward inflexibility of prices, have a disproportionate effect
on the price index.
           Pujol and Griffiths (1998) find that sectoral price changes in Poland during 1989-1995
were, indeed, quite skewed, suggesting that, in this period, some sectors were experiencing
relatively large price changes while the price changes of other sectors were closely bunched.
Moreover, the standard deviation of sectoral price changes around the mean was quite large, and
this high standard deviation did not decline much over their sample period. Coorey et al. (1998)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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also find that the variance of relative prices does have a significant impact on the rate of inflation
in 21 transition economies.
 3. The Freeing of Controlled Prices.  A variety of prices, mostly having to do with government
and municipal services, utilities and rents, and energy were not fully freed during the initial price
liberalizations.  Instead, governments either froze these prices or adopted a program of phased
liberalization. In some cases, controlled prices were to be increased in an ad hoc manner until
they reached equilibrium, and then decontrolled. In other cases, increases were based on a
formula whereby prices would increase by a factor equal to the previous years’ inflation plus
some pre-specified percentage, so that they would outpace inflation, but only by a limited amount,
and thus move toward equilibrium at a controlled pace. Often, rents and municipal services were
priced on a cost-plus basis (see Czech National Bank, 1998, Table 3b).
                  Such a price setting pattern leads to the persistence of inflation because a part of the
consumer price index (CPI) market basket consists of goods whose prices by definition must
grow at rates that exceed the past inflation rate. Consequently, changes in the prices of regulated
goods are both inimical to reductions in the rate of inflation and exogenous as far as monetary
policy and its impact on inflation are concerned. The existence of these goods makes it extremely
difficult to reduce inflation quickly because the burden of slowing price growth below the rates of
past inflation falls on those goods in the consumer price index whose prices are not set in this
way. Moreover, as prices of controlled goods are freed up, large one-time increases move the CPI
upward in a way that disguises the broader tendencies in prices.
4.  Wage-Pull Inflation.  Nominal wages in the three countries have grown more rapidly than
has the CPI, so that real wages have grown steadily since the early transition. Productivity gains
have been alleged to be lower than the gains in real wages. Some observers (Begg, 1998;William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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Drabek, 1999) argue that real wage growth is the result of poor corporate governance, which
leaves managers with few incentives to resist workers’ demands for wage increases. Excessive
backward-looking indexing of wages is often institutionalized. In the Czech Republic, tripartite
negotiations between the government, labor unions and representatives have set real wage floors.
In Hungary, in similar negotiations, the unions have regularly and successfully rejected
government inflation forecasts in favor of projections based on past inflation. Moreover, in some
countries, the Czech Republic in particular, it is the government sector that has set the pace for
large wage increases.
B.  What Kind of Monetary Policy for Disinflation?
Whatever institutional and environmental obstacles the monetary authorities face in their
efforts to reduce inflation to single-digit levels, they also have to decide what kind of monetary
policy to implement. In the early transition period, monetary policy was implemented within the
context of a heterodox stabilization program utilizing multiple nominal anchors. However, the
purported use of nominal anchors, especially of the nominal exchange rate, was discarded fairly
early in Poland, later in Hungry and only on 1997 in the Czech Republic.
6 The abandonment of
the nominal exchange anchor left central banks with the need to determine some other target for
monetary policy. The money stock was regarded as an unsatisfactory target because velocity was
perceived as being too variable. Interest rates, too, were problematic, in part because of the
tenuous links between interest rates and the behavior of economic agents and the constraints on
interest rates, both of which we have discussed above.
Consequently, an approach that was adopted by the Czech National Bank (CNB) at the
end of 1997,  sometime later by the Polish monetary authorities and most recently by Hungary, isWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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inflation targeting. The concept of net inflation, which excludes from the computation of the rate
of inflation the increases in the prices of price-regulated and of seasonally volatile goods, is
sometimes used as a target. The Czech National Bank set two targets, a “control” target of 5.5-
6.5% net inflation at the end of 1998 and a three–year target of 3.5-5.5%  net inflation by the end
of 2000 (Czech National Bank, 1998) .
 In Poland, the Monetary Policy Council set a target of 8-8.5% growth of the CPI in 1999
and 4% for 2003. Both central banks have stressed the advantages of inflation targeting over more
traditional approaches to monetary policy. One such advantage is the greater transparency of
inflation targeting relative to policies that target either monetary aggregates or the exchange rate.
In their adoption of inflation targeting, the CNB and the NBP and more recently the National
Bank of Hungary are joining a number of central banks in developed market economies such as
Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and New Zealand all of which use inflation targeting
(Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
The essence of monetary policy in countries following inflation targeting is to set inflation
targets and then to pursue them without regard to output or employment objectives targets
(McDonough, 1997). This requires that the central bank must have considerable independence in
conducting its monetary policy, including the absence of what Masson et al. (1997) call fiscal
dominance, the reliance of the state on either central or commercial bank financing. The central
bank must also forego any nominal targets other than the price level.  Moreover, the central bank
must be able to calibrate the functional relationship between its policy instruments and future
inflation.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Indeed, although the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor was seen as a key element of credibility for the
transition economies’ stabilization programs, in practice the exchange rate never served that role. For the Czech
case, see Janackova (1996). Wellisz (1997) aptly sums up the Polish experience.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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           In order to evaluate the feasibility of using inflation targeting, or even of more traditional
and backward-looking approaches to monetary policy, in these transition economies, we estimate
a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the price level for each country. This model shows which
causal factors are the most important sources of continuing inflation these countries and thus the
feasibility of reducing inflation by means of monetary policy.
IV.  METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A key issue in economic modeling is whether the time series under investigation are
nonstationary or stationary around a deterministic trend. Recent work using the VAR
specification imposes the assumption that the series under consideration are difference-stationary
(DS) (e.g., Feldstein and Stock (1994)), that is, that the original series are nonstationary.  Several
studies, however, question this assumption due to the low power of stationarity tests (Dejong, et
al. (1992), Dejong (1992), Dejong and Whiteman (1991 a, b), and Rudebusch (1993)).  These
studies suggest that it is difficult to distinguish between DS as the null and trend-stationary (TS)
as the alternative hypothesis. In a more recent paper, Canova (1998) studies the business cycle
properties of a small set of real macroeconomic time series for period 1955-1986.  He finds that
using different detrending techniques, including a linear time trend and first-order differences,
produces different – both quantitatively and qualitatively – “stylized facts” of  business cycles.
        This distinction is important in understanding whether shocks to inflation have permanent or
transitory effects. For example, if variables are nonstationary, and consequently best represented
by the DS model, then shocks to explanatory variables produce permanent shifts in inflation. This
is because such shocks affect the stochastic trend component of the price level and thus cause a
permanent change in the inflation rate by affecting it for all future horizons. On the other hand, ifWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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a TS model best represents the time series, then fluctuations around a trend level of these series
are stationary or mean reverting. In such a model, shocks to explanatory variables have only a
transitory impact on inflation as the price level returns to its trend level and the long-term
inflation rate remains unchanged.
Note that under either specification there may be some persistence in the inflation rate.
For a DS model, this persistence would be permanent whereas it would be only transitory under a
TS model. Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) provide some indirect evidence on the appropriate
specification from 12 moderate-inflation countries, including Hungary. They find that inflation
persisted at moderate levels for more than a decade, thus providing support for the
appropriateness of a DS specification for countries experiencing moderate inflation. Nevertheless,
given the uncertainty about the existence of a unit root in economic time series and the sensitivity
of the results to the different specifications used (Canova (1998); Hafer and Kutan (1997, 2001)),
we model the relationship between inflation and its potential determinants using both the TS and
the DS specification. To do so, we estimate two VAR systems. One system uses the log-levels of
the variables along with a deterministic time trend. The other uses the log-difference of the series
and excludes the trend term.  The first system represents the TS specification, and the second one
represents the DS specification.
V. DATA AND CAUSALITY TESTS RESULTS
A. Data
A data set consisting of monthly observations for M2, the broad nominal money
supply, the consumer price index (CPI), nominal average wages, and import prices is used in the
analysis. Because no monthly data are available for import prices, following previous studies,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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(Laursen (1998)), this series was constructed using the exchange-rate-adjusted foreign wholesale
price index. Specifically, the German wholesale price index, adjusted for changes in the domestic
currency (forint, koruna, zloty)/DM rate, was used as a proxy for import prices in all the
estimations. The domestic currency/DM exchange rate is obtained using the $/domestic currency
and DM/domestic currency rates assuming arbitrage.  The sample period runs from 1990 to the
end of 1998 for Hungary and Poland, and 1993 to the end of 1998 for the Czech Republic. The
sample period ends in 1998 because we wanted to use parameters in the VAR model and
decomposition exercises that reflected the period leading up to and including the fall in import
prices but not the period covering the subsequent increase in import prices.
 All data are taken from the Harver data set, which is based on OECD data, of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, except wages, which were compiled from various issues of PlanEcon
Reports.  The data were seasonally adjusted using the multiplicative (ratio-to-moving average)
seasonal adjustment technique.  All estimations were carried out using the E-Views 3.1 software
package.
B. Causality Test Results
  Given the ongoing methodological debate discussed in the preceding section, two VAR
systems were estimated. One system used all variables in log-levels and included a time trend.
This system represents the trend-stationary (TS) specification. Under this specification, the
dependent variable is the price level (CPI). This and other series are assumed stationary around a
trend, so the shocks to the instruments of monetary policy have only transitory impact on the price
level and thus on inflation.  The other system uses first-differences of the data but excludes the
time trend.  This system represents the difference-stationary (DS) specification. Under this
specification, the data series possess stochastic trends in the sense that the shocks to the systemWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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are not mean reverting over time. Series need to be first-differenced to make them stationary, so
that the statistical inferences made under OLS would be valid.   Each specification, TS or DS,
includes a constant term.
It is important to note that the standard causality tests based on the level, i.e., TS,
specification are valid only if the series are trend-stationary, or if they are difference stationary
and cointegrated.  In other words, if the series are nonstationary but they are not cointegrated,
then standard F-statistics are not valid for the level specification because they do not have the
correct distribution (Sims, Stock and Watson (1990)). Because the VAR results are sensitive to
the lag length, we use Akaike’s information criterion to select the optimal number of lags in the
estimated VARs and the number of lags used for each model are reported in the corresponding
Tables 1-3 for each country. All VAR specifications also include two (0,1) dummy shift variables
to capture administrative price increases for fuel and electricity as well as the introduction of, or
rate changes in, VAT and excise taxes for all three countries. In addition, a dummy variable is
used to account for the May 1997 currency crisis in the Czech Republic. Anticipating the
discussion of our results, note that all the dummy variables were significant at the 10 percent level
or better. By accounting for the impact of administrative price changes at the outset and thus
netting them out of observed inflation, we are more likely to capture the impact of monetary
policy instruments on inflation. In this sense, our dependent variable corresponds to the so-called
“core-inflation” used in earlier studies of inflation in transition economies (Laursen, 1998).
Tables 1 through 3 report the causality test results for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland, respectively.   Because our focus is on the relationship between the instruments of
monetary policy and inflation, the tables report only results for the inflation rate.  According to
the results in Table 1, both import prices and own past lags are significant determinants of CzechWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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inflation at the 10 percent level or better, regardless of the TS or DS specification employed. The
outcome on the significance of money and wages depends on the stationarity assumption used,
however.  Only when the difference-stationary assumption is imposed on the data does money
become a statistically significant cause of inflation at the 5 percent level. On the other hand,
wages are statistically significant at the 10 percent level only if one assumes trend stationarity.
The causality results that are reported in Table 2 for Hungary paint somewhat a different
picture. Both import prices and own lags significantly affect inflation behavior in Hungary at the
5 percent level of better regardless of the specification used. On the other hand, movements in
wages and in broad money do not Granger-cause price movements for either specification.
The test results reported in Table 3 for Poland again indicate that both import prices and
past inflation, but not wages, are significant determinants of inflation in Poland, a finding that
holds for both specifications. The significance of money is sensitive to the stationarity assumption
is used, however. Only under the DS specification do money supply movements Granger cause
inflation at the 5 percent level. This means that the M2 growth rate has a permanent impact on
inflation, but only if one believes that the series are best represented by the DS model.
Overall, the causality tests results show that both import price changes and past inflation
have significantly influenced the consumer price level and inflation over time in all these three
countries. With respect to import prices, whose movements are dominated by exchange rate
changes over the early part of the sample and then by the fall of import prices due to oil price
decreases and West European deflation in the latter part of the sample, the results suggest that the
foreign sector has been a major factor affecting inflation rate in the region. To the extent that
inflationary expectations are assumed to be adaptive, the significance of own past price lags inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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our estimates implies that inflationary expectations have been very persistent and that t they have
also played an important role in inflation behavior.
Although the statistical significance of import prices and past inflation is robust across
countries and for both specifications, this is not the case for wages and the money supply. The
results indicate that wage movements have played no statistically significant role in either Polish
or Hungarian inflation, regardless of whether we use the TS or DS model.  The significance of
wages in the Czech Republic is sensitive to the specification used. Only under the TS model do
wages have a statistically significant impact on inflation at the 10 percent significance level. This
finding means that wage changes have only a temporary impact on inflation in the Czech
Republic during our sample period. Thus, we can conclude that changes in nominal wages did not
have a significant permanent impact on inflation in any of the countries in our sample.
Changes in broad money supply, M2, are significant for both the Czech Republic and
Poland but only using the DS model. This is consistent with the expectation that, in the long run,
inflation is, indeed, a monetary phenomenon. Assuming that the DS model better captures the true
underlying data generating process for inflation and the other variables in our system, we find that
the M2 growth rate had a permanent effect on inflation in both countries during the 1990-98
period. In terms of statistical significance, then, monetary policy can be seen as having an impact
on the rate of inflation in these countries.  When evaluating the effectiveness of monetary policy,
however, the key question is not merely the significance of coefficients but, more important,
whether  the magnitude of the effect of changes in M2  on inflation is large relative to the effects
of other significant factors.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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VI. VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS
      The foregoing regression results determined whether import prices, wages, broad money
(M2), and past inflation are statistically significant in explaining the behavior of current level of
inflation.  The F- tests results reported earlier may be viewed as “within-sample” tests, because
they do not provide an indication of the dynamic characteristics of variables in the system and
their usefulness is limited to the sample period used. As a result, we next report results based on
variance decompositions, which may be considered as out-of-sample tests (Masih and Masih,
2001).
            To address whether a change in the money stock or in import prices generate a relatively
large change in inflation, variance decompositions from the different VAR models are calculated,
using the Cholesky decomposition procedure.  Two orderings are used.  One ordering is prices
(CPI), wages, import prices and money (M2). As a check on the results, an alternative ordering of
money, import prices, wages and prices also is used.
Tables 4 through 6 report the variance decompositions, using up to twelve-month horizon.
Results are reported for up to four horizons, for each of the two possible orderings, and for the TS
and DS specifications.  Looking first at the results for the Czech Republic in Table 4, the variance
decompositions generated by the first ordering, CPI, wages, import prices, M2,  are reported in
the upper part of the Table in panel A. These results indicate that shocks to M2 account for about
10.7 and 7.7 percent of the variation in inflation over a 12-month horizon under the DS and TS
assumptions, respectively.  The wage shocks play a larger role in inflation variation under the TS
specification, 14.8 percent versus 7.8 percent for the DS specification. This is consistent with the
evidence from the causality test results in Table 1.  The limited impact of money stock and wage
shocks on the rate of inflation in Table 3 stand in stark contrast to the strong impact from shocksWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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to import prices. Over a time horizon of one year, a shock to the  import price variable accounts
for 29.9 and 23.3 percent of the variation in inflation under the DS and TS models, respectively.
Finally, the own past shocks, representing persistence in inflation over time, account for 51.6 and
54.2 percent of variation in inflation at the end of 12-month horizon under the DS and TS models,
respectively.  Changing the ordering of the variables, as shown in the lower part of Table 4 in
panel B, does not materially change the results.
Comparing our decomposition results with those of the causality test results, we conclude
that nominal wage and money supply changes have not had a significant role in explaining the
behavior of inflation in the Czech Republic. At best, changes in wages and M2 can explain 18.0
(under the TS model) and 10.7 percent (under the DS model) of the total variation in inflation rate
during the entire sample period. On the other hand, past inflation, which serves as a proxy for the
persistence of inflationary expectations, and growth of import prices have been the main causes of
inflation in the Czech Republic, jointly explaining about 75 percent of inflation variation during
the 1993-98 period.
The decomposition results for Hungary are reported in Table 5.  When the panel A
ordering is used, M2 shocks account for 5.6 and 4.3 percent of the variation in inflation over the
12-month horizon, depending on whether the difference-stationary or trend-stationary assumption
is used.  The effect of wages is relatively weak, accounting for 9.4 and 18.5 of the variation in
inflation under the DS and TS models, respectively. Over the 12-month horizon, import price
shocks account for 7.4 and 51.6 percent of inflation variation depending whether the DS or TS
assumption is used, while own past innovations account 77.6 and 25.6 percent of the variation in
inflation under the DS and TS specifications respectively. The results are robust to re-ordering.
Switching to the alternative ordering in panel B does not qualitatively change the results.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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Note that the effects of changing the stationarity assumption are more marked for Hungary
than for the Czech Republic. If one assumes trend-stationarity, shocks to import prices have a
very small impact on inflation in panel A, about 7 percent. When one imposes difference
stationarity on the data, however, the impact of shocks to import prices is increased to about 57
percent. These results are again robust to the re-ordering in panel B.  This finding suggests that
the impact of import price shocks on inflation can be best described as transitory. Similar results
hold for past innovations in the rate of inflation. Under the TS specification, the past own shocks
account for about 25 percent of total variation in inflation; but this effect jumps up to about 77
percent under the DS specification, suggesting that the impact of past inflation shocks on current
inflation are permanent and much larger under the DS model than for the TS model.
Finally, Table 6 presents the variance decompositions for Poland. Using the panel A
ordering, the effect of an M2 shock on inflation is about 11 and 2 percent under the DS and TS
assumptions, respectively. Wage shocks have a very limited role in explaining inflation variation
regardless of the specification used.  Again, import prices and own price shocks have the
strongest impact on inflation variation in Poland. The results for the import price shocks are also
sensitive to the stationarity assumption employed, however. The effect of an import price shock
falls from 35.0 percent to 22.6 percent when we impose the difference-stationary assumption.
Using the alternative ordering produces qualitatively similar results.
Overall, the variance decomposition results indicate that import price shocks and own past
innovations, meaning the persistence of expectations regarding the rate of inflation, have played
the most important role in the dynamics of inflation in all the countries in our sample. The relative
effects of the explanatory variables on inflation also are affected significantly by the stationarity
assumption employed, but re-ordering of the variables in the estimated VAR systems did notWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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change the results qualitatively.  For example, if one assumes trend stationarity, shocks to import
prices have a much larger impact on inflation than do shocks under difference stationarity, and
this result is quite robust with respect to the ordering of the variables. The result that import prices
have a larger role under the TS specification in explaining inflation variation, in particular for
Poland and Hungary, means that the import price changes have had a significant but transitory
impact on inflation. 
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the three countries we examine, nominal wage growth and the money supply are
quantitatively unimportant contributors to the inflationary process in the short run.  Because these
two factors, which are relatively easy for monetary authorities to influence, have so little short-
term impact on inflation, the decline in inflation in these countries at the end of the 1990s may not
be a good indicator of the effectiveness of monetary policy and of the future ability of monetary
authorities in these countries to reduce inflation to, or to contain it at, the levels seen in the late
1990s or required after accession to the European Union.
In the TS specification, the dominance of import prices suggests that changes in import
prices may be the principal source of transitory shocks to inflation. This may explain why the
Czech Republic, which maintained a nominal peg the longest and which, by virtue of the peg’s
design, actually experienced significant periods of appreciation versus the DM, had the lowest
inflation rate of the three countries.
7 Our findings regarding the role of foreign prices in
determining inflation also explain the sharp decline in inflation in the three countries at the end of
the 1990s.  Import prices measured on a month-on-month basis had fallen by as much as 10
                                                          
7 The Czech Koruna was pegged to a basket consisting of the US$ and the DM. Due to fluctuations in the $/DM
exchange rate, the koruna fluctuated significantly versus the DM.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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percent by year end 1998. Tradables account for about 70 percent of the CPI in these three
countries. Thus, the importance of foreign prices in propagating or, in this case, ameliorating
inflation implied by our econometric results well explains the precipitous decline in the rate of
inflation in these countries.  It also serves to explain the increase in the rate of inflation seen in
Figure 1 for 2001 and evident from monthly data for 2002.
The important role of the foreign sector in influencing inflation in our VAR specification
might suggest that nominal appreciation or at least a fixing of the nominal exchange rate as a
desirable policy for deflation in these countries. There are two problems with this approach. First,
such a policy stance would hardly differentiate a forward-looking inflation targeting policy from
the old one of a nominal exchange rate anchor. Second, it implies a real appreciation of the
transition economies’ currencies, an appreciation that seems incompatible with current account
equilibrium, with promoting export-led growth and with preventing massive capital flows. Most
critically, any peg on the eve of accession to European Union membership would have to be a
credible on for the long run.
The longer-term implications seem to be equally problematic for monetary policy
advocates. The other main determinant of current inflation is its past path, which can be
interpreted to represent the inflationary expectations of the population. Masson et al. (1997) offer
some insights on why inflationary expectations may persist. Among the causes of the persistence
of inflationary expectations they cite are:
-symptoms of fiscal dominance, meaning the government’s use of the central bank or of
commercial banks to finance its deficit (p.8);
-poor starting conditions, especially levels of inflation in excess of 10% (p. 20);
-a failure to eradicate the fiscal roots of inflation (p.22).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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These factors can be found to a greater or lesser extent in each of the three countries we have
examined. Moreover, the monetary authorities can resolve none of them. Indeed, with the
exception of the second factor, the responsibility for creating the appropriate conditions rests
squarely with the governments of these countries. The importance of foreign prices and their
decline at the end of the 1990s created a window of opportunity during which lower current
inflation brought about by falling import prices also lowered inflationary expectations. Such a
lowering of expectations could have set off a virtuous cycle of falling inflation due to the
importance of the persistence of inflation for its future course. The post -2000 data on inflation
provide little evidence that the governments of these three countries were able to seize this
opportunity as inflation has started to rise again, even if moderated somewhat by the expectations
effect.
         Our results show that the decline in inflation to historically low levels experienced by the
three countries at the end of the 1990s (Figure 1) is the result of external deflation that stems from
exogenous declines in global commodity and energy prices and from a general global deflation. In
1998, this trend of global deflation was augmented by relatively favorable exchange rate
movements between these three countries’ currencies and those of their major trading partners.
Thus, the sharp decline in inflation observed at the end of the 1990s in the three countries should
be seen as an exogenously caused event rather than the outcome of monetary policy.
8 These
exogenous factors have already begun to reverse themselves, especially in terms of energy prices.
Thus, inflation remains a threat to these countries and the successes of the late 1990s may not be
an accurate indicator of how well the monetary authorities in these countries can control inflation
under new international circumstances.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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Figure 1 - Annual Inflation Rates
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Table 1: Causality Test Results: F-Statistics – The Czech Republic
Independent Variables
Stationary
Assumption
Dependent
Variable
Money Wages Import
Prices
Own Lags
DS Inflation rate  2.82
(0.05)
1.37
(0.26)
11.64
(0.00)
2.10
(0.10)
TS Price level
(CPI)
1.87
(0.15)
2.36
(0.08)
8.92
(0.00)
8.36
(0.00)
Notes:
1.  DS denotes the difference-stationary assumption while TS denotes the  trend-stationary
assumption.  The optimal lag length in estimated VARs is chosen based on the
minimizing the Akaike’s information criterion and it is 3 and 4 for the TS and DS
specifications, respectively.
2.  All VAR estimations included three (0,1) dummy shift variables to capture the May 1997
currency crisis, the administrative price hikes for fuel and electricity, and VAT and
excise taxes. The results (not reported) showed that all the dummy variables were
significant at the 10 percent significance level or better.
3.  Since no monthly data are available for import prices, following other studies (e.g.,
Laursen, 1998),  this series was constructed using the exchange rate adjusted foreign
wholesale price index. Specifically, the German wholesale price index adjusted for
changes in the koruna/DM rate was used as a proxy for import prices in all the
estimations here and that follow. The koruna/DM exchange rate is obtained using the
$/koruna and DM/koruna rates assuming arbitrage.
4.  The values in parentheses are the p-values for the statistical significance of the variables.
Coefficients significant at the 10% level or better are in bold face.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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Table 2: Causality Test Results: F-Statistics – Hungary
Independent Variables
Stationary
Assumption
Dependent
Variable
Money Wages Import
Prices
Own Lags
DS Inflation rate 0.79
(0.58)
1.62
(0.16)
2.92
(0.01)
2.33
(0.04)
TS Price level
(CPI)
0.55
(0.76)
1.50
(0.19)
2.78
(0.02)
25.28
(0.00)
Notes
1.  See Table1.
2.  Lag length for both specifications was six based on the Akaike’s criterion.
The sample period for Hungary starts in December 1990 because there were no monthly data
available prior to this date. The National Bank of Hungary has also stopped publishing figures
for M2 at the end of 1997. The figures for 1998 were compiled using the individual components
of M2 published by the Bank.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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             Table 3: Causality Test Results: F-Statistics – Poland
Independent Variables
Stationary
Assumption
Dependent
Variable
Money Wages Import
Prices
Own Lags
DS Inflation rate 2.29
(0.04)
1.05
(0.40)
6.86
(0.00)
37.1
(0.00)
TS Price level
(CPI)
1.68
(0.13)
0.37
(0.89)
2.13
(0.06)
82.58
(0.00)
Notes:
1.  See Table1.
2.  Lag length for both specifications was six using the Akaike’s criterion.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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Table 4:   Variance Decompositions for Inflation: The Czech Republic
Panel A: Ordering- CPI, Wage, Import Price, Money
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3 11.8 1.7   0.8   3.7 18.9   9.6 68.3 85.0
6 11.5 3.6   7.4   8.7 26.3 24.2 54.7 63.4
9 10.9 6.7   7.3 13.3 29.7 23.3 52.1 56.7
12 10.7 7.7   7.8 14.8 29.9 23.3 51.6 54.2
Panel B: Ordering – Money, Import Price, Wages, CPI
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  10.3   2.1   0.7 15.8 22.8 10.8 66.2 66.2
6  10.7   4.0   4.5 20.8 30.2 21.3 54.5 54.5
9  10.0   7.0   4.9 18.2 32.3 28.9 52.6 52.6
12    9.9   6.9   5.2 18.0 32.7 31.8 52.1 52.1William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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Table 5:   Variance Decompositions for Inflation: Hungary
Panel A: Ordering- CPI, Wage, Import Price, Money
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  2.3   0.3   6.2   1.4 1.7   1.4 89.8 96.9
6  3.3 10.2   8.6   5.9 4.4 19.5 83.6 64.3
9  4.6   6.1   9.0 16.3 6.5 43.2 79.8 34.4
12  5.6   4.3   9.4 18.5 7.4 51.6 77.6 25.6
Panel B: Ordering – Money, Import Price, Wages, CPI
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3   6.4   7.8   7.8   1.3   3.6   8.8 82.1  82.1
6   7.4 10.6   9.4   6.3   5.2 30.8 78.0  52.2
9   7.7   6.9   9.6 18.8   7.3 41.2 75.3  33.1
12   9.1   6.6  10.0 21.6   7.7 45.2 73.1  26.5William Davidson Institute Working Paper 433
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           Table 6:   Variance Decompositions for Inflation: Poland
Panel A: Ordering- CPI, Wage, Import Price, Money
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  11.5   3.2   0.3   1.0 14.6  14.7 73.7 81.0
6  11.3   2.2   2.9   0.8 20.9  27.2 64.8 69.0
9  11.3   2.2   4.3   1.0 21.7  33.7 62.7 63.1
12  11.1   1.9   5.5   1.7 22.6  35.0 60.7 61.5
Panel B: Ordering – Money, Import Price, Wages, CPI
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  16.4   3.0   0.5    0.5   13.0  13.1 70.0  83.5
6  16.5   2.5   3.2    0.4   18.5  25.0 61.7  72.1
9  17.4   2.4   4.3    0.6   19.3  31.5 59.1  65.5
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